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The history of international law has recently come to the forefront of legal debates. Broadly defined as the 
field of study that examines the evolution of public international law and investigates state practice, the 
development of given legal concepts and theories as well as the life and work of its makers, the history of 
international law (HIL) or international legal history has attracted the growing attention of international 
lawyers, legal historians, and other interested audiences. Despite its flourishing, the history of international 
law is still in search of a proper methodology. Two cultures of writing compete in the making of 
international legal history: ‘historians’ history’ and ‘jurists’ history.’ While legal historians are interested in 
the past for its own sake and put legal history in context, lawyers tend to be interested in the past for the 
light it throws on the present. The existence of (and sometimes competition between) two methodologies raises 
an important question: should international legal historians  choose either the historians’ history or jurists’ 
history and then confine themselves to that approach, or should they adopt a comprehensive and inter-
disciplinary stance? This Article is exploratory and aims to address this question by investigating the 
methodological risks and opportunities of writing the histories of international law.  
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The history of international law has recently come to the forefront of legal debates. 
Defined as the field of study that examines the evolution of public international law and 
investigates state practice, the development of legal concepts and theories, and the life and 
work of its makers, the history of international law (HIL) or international legal history has 
attracted the growing attention of international lawyers, legal historians, and other 
interested audiences.1  New monographs and edited books have been published on various 
aspects of the history of international law; reputable book series and journals have been 
established in the field.2 The linkage between international law and history has attracted an 
increasing wealth of promising research.3  
Several factors have prompted this renaissance. First, legal historians, who have 
traditionally focused on the history of domestic law, have started investigating the history 
of international law, due to the latter being unmapped, under-researched, and in need of 
systematization. In turn, international lawyers have dedicated sustained attention to the 
field. The proliferation of international law and its governance of almost any field of 
human activity has resulted in some growth pains and required some self-reflection as to 
international law’s origins, aims and objectives. Second, the end of the Cold War, the 
opening of archives which had been previously closed to the public and academic 
researchers, and the digitization of archives have facilitated access to newly available 
sources. Third, like in other eras of major political, economic and cultural upheaval, history 
is perceived as providing new perspectives and a key to understanding the past in order to 
better forge our future.4 
Despite flourishing, the history of international law is still in search of a proper 
methodology. Two cultures of writing history compete in its making: ‘historians’ history’ 
and ‘jurists’ history’.5 Two different epistemic communities—historians on the one hand 
and international lawyers on the other—put different questions to legal texts. While legal 
historians are interested in the past for its own sake and put it in context,6 lawyers tend to 
be interested in the past for the light it throws on the present7 and consider it as ‘a self-
                                               
1 This Article uses the terms ‘history of international law’ and ‘international legal history’ as synonyms. See 
David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion 17 QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW 
(1997) 99, 99 (using the terms ‘international legal history’ and ‘history of international law’ interchangeably). 
2 Matt Craven, Introduction: International Law and Its Histories, in Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and 
Maria Vogiatzi (eds.) TIME, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) 1, 2 (noting that “[i]n recent years, 
there has been an extraordinary outpouring of articles and monographs written on the history of the 
discipline” and signalling “the emergence of new specialist journals on the topic.”) 
3 See e.g. Randall Lesaffer, International Law and Its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love, in Matthew Craven, 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.) TIME, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) 27, 28 
(highlighting that “during the last decade , the interest in the history of international law has suddenly risen.”) 
4 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, Human Rights and History, PAST AND PRESENT (2016) 1–32, at 26 (noting that 
without past, the present seems bound to regenerate the past and “the future is seen no longer as a promise 
but as a threat”); Craven, Introduction, 5 (noting that “historical reflection may be useful as a way of situating 
the present” if not “the only way to move on”); Lesaffer, International Law and Its History, 29 (noting that at all 
critical moments in the history of international law, scholars have typically turned to revisit the discipline’s 
foundations) 
5 Lesaffer, International Law and Its History, 29 (stressing that “[t]he historiography of international law is an 
interdisciplinary subject with two natural constituencies: international lawyers and legal historians.”)  
6 MICHAEL KAMMEN, SELVAGES AND BIASES: THE FABRIC OF HISTORY IN AMERICAN CULTURE 116–17 
(1987) (noting the paradigm shift among historians in the mid-twentieth century from searching for a ‘usable 
past’ to focusing on the ‘pastness of the past,’ that is, “accept[ing] the past on its own terms” rather than 
translating it “into our own contemporary frame of reference”). 
7 Edward M. Wise, Legal History, in Daniel Robert Woolf (ed.) A GLOBAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF HISTORICAL 




contained universe,’ tracing the genealogy of given concepts with little if any attention to 
the context.8  
Several questions arise in this context. Should a scholar stick to one discipline only—be it 
international law or legal history? Or should one adopt a comprehensive and inter-
disciplinary stance, enabling international lawyers and legal historians to work together in 
mapping the history of international law? Or, rather, should one adopt post-disciplinary 
approaches abandoning existing disciplines in order to ‘think beyond old boundaries’?9 
If one reasonably assumes equality between international law and legal history, both 
should have equal footing in mapping the history of international law. However, as most 
international lawyers are not historians by training and, in parallel, most historians do not 
have in-depth expertise in international law, doubts remain as to the proper methodology 
to be adopted. Should one be concerned with the historical record or its legal afterglow? 
Should legal historians be cognizant of current international law to understand its past? In 
parallel, should international law scholars be cognizant of historical method(s) for writing 
the history of the field? If so, which historical method suits their research better? Should 
they focus on the history of institutions or concepts across time and space, or rather prefer 
the biographical genre? Should they look at the context in which international law came 
into being? Can one expect them to visit archives and critically engage with historical 
sources? Is the history of international law a sui generis field of study that in fact requires ad 
hoc methods and approaches?  
This Article aims to address these questions by investigating the methodological risks and 
opportunities of writing the histories of international law. It will explore different methods 
of writing the history of international law. The history of international law is a sufficiently 
developed field to merit discussion of rigorous methods. The objective of the article, 
however, is not to prescribe a certain method to use in all scholarship moving forward; 
international legal history is a diverse field, and some flexibility will always be required. 
There is no single history of international law. Rather, multiple histories can and have been 
written depending on the selected topic, method and perspective. Consequently, there is no 
single method for writing such histories. Rather, different methods and approaches can co-
exist; it is up to the researcher to identify a suitable method for reaching his or her research 
objectives.  
The identification and calibration of the research method is not an arbitrary endeavor; 
rather, there is a rich panoply of tested, rigorous and consolidated methods which 
researchers can use. Analogously, there is no ideal form of research, as histories of 
concepts, legal biographies and institutional histories all contribute to the complex 
kaleidoscope represented by the history of international law. This Article contends that the 
battle of ideas about the proper methodology of the history of international law should be 
gradually overcome by a growing awareness of the complementarity of expertise of 
international lawyers and legal historians. The varied disciplinary approaches promote 
better narrations of the history of international law through acknowledgement of cultural 
backgrounds and methodological awareness. Rather than merely focusing on consolidated, 
but passé, intra-disciplinary approaches to the history of international law (that is, 
approaching the history of international law from a purely legal history or international law 
perspective), the article also examines interdisciplinary, approaches, given that both legal 
history and international law are necessary components of the emerging field of the history 
of international law. While intradisciplinary approaches require researchers working on 
                                                                                                                                                            
the whole, the interest displayed by international lawyers in their history is functional and is dictated by 
current needs”).  
8 Id. at 551. 
9 Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum, Pre-disciplinary and Post-disciplinary Perspectives, NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 6 




given research questions to use the same set of methods whithin given disciplinary 
boundaries (for instance, legal history or international law), interdisciplinary approaches 
enable the combination and integration of knowledge from various scientific disciplines 
(including but not limited to legal history and international law).10  
The Article proceeds as follows. First, it explores why history matters in general and the 
reasons for the growing interest in the history of international law in particular.  Second, it 
examines the battle of ideas between historians and lawyers on how to write the history of 
international law. Third, it addresses the question of what kind of history we should have. 
It explores four dimensions of legal historiography: 1) global/local, 2) internal/external, 3) 
diachronic/synchronic, and 4) micro/macro. Fourth, it examines the principal 
historiographical currents for writing the history of international law, analyzing and 
critically assessing their pros and cons. The Article does not aim to offer a complete 
summary of the work done in the area. Rather, it provides an introduction to some of the 
relevant key issues and debates in international legal history, with the goal of stimulating 
interest in field and contributing to its development. Fifth, it examines discusses three 
modes of writing history—the history of events, the history of concepts, and the history of 
individual people—and examines the use of legal biography as a literary genre within 
international law scholarship, addressing the question of whether the history of 
international law might benefit from further work in this direction. Finally, after providing 
a critical reflection on the promises and pitfalls of the turn to history of international law 
and the international turn of legal history, this Article concludes that there is no single 
method for writing the history of international law. Rather, scholars can select the 
appropriate method among a variety of different approaches. The selection of the 
appropriate method is case-specific and should be based on the specific aims and 
objectives of the author. Both international lawyers and legal historians can benefit from 
dialogue, mutual exchange and methodological awareness. This paper argues that excellent 
history of international law transcends the borders of pure international law or legal history 
analysis and may constitute an autonomous field of study.   
 
1. Does History Matter? 
 
While the history of international law received little if any attention in the past two 
centuries—historians were not interested in international law, while international lawyers 
were not interested in legal history—this state of affairs has started to change..11 The shift 
in the number of books and the quality of these books has fostered the perceived 
importance of the field.12 Reputable book series and journals have been established in the 
                                               
10  See e.g. Friedrich Kratochwil, A Guide for the Perplexed? Critical Reflections on Doing Inter-Disciplinary Legal 
Research, 5 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY (2014) 541, 541–556 (discussing “the limits and opportunities” 
of inter-disciplinary legal research.) 
11  See Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and Method, 2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1908) 313 (noting that “[I]n spite of the vast importance of this task it has as yet 
hardly been undertaken; the history of international law is certainly the most neglected province of it.”) A 
century later, the assessment has not changed. See Stephen C. Neff, A Short History of International Law, in 
MALCOLM EVANS, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), at 3 (noting that “No area of international law has been so 
little explored by scholars as the history of the subject.”). 
12 See generally, among others, Pierre Marie Dupuy and Vincent Chetail (eds.) THE ROOTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW/LE FONDEMENTS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL—LIBER AMICORUM PETER HAGGENMACHER (2014) 
(analyzing the origins and foundations of the international legal system, with particular focus on Hugo 
Grotius); DOMINIQUE GAURIER, HISTOIRE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (2014) (tracing the origins of the law 
of nations back to antiquity, examining its evolution until the end of the Society of nations in 1945 and using 
primary sources in abundance); Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012) (analysing the history of international law from the 15th century 




field.13 International law and legal history journals also increasingly feature articles on the 
history of international law. 14  Histories of sub-fields of international law have also 
emerged.15 This represents a shift from the past, when most legal historians focused on the 
vicissitudes of domestic law and international lawyers used the past instrumentally to 
investigate legal concepts or institutions rather than as a specific object of their scientific 
                                                                                                                                                            
of those individuals who shaped the development of international law); AMNON ALTMAN, TRACING THE 
EARLIEST RECORDED CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST (2500–330 BC) 
(2012) (surveying legal theories and practices relating to international relations in the Ancient Near East 
between 2500 and 330 BC); CARLO FOCARELLI, INTRODUZIONE STORICA AL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 
(2012)(covering the history of international law from antiquity to the present); EMMANUELLE JOUANNET, LE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL LIBÉRAL–PROVIDENCE. UNE HISTOIRE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (2011) (placing 
the origins of international law in the 18th century and suggesting that a dual liberal-welfarist structural 
framework underlies international law); Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed.) RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
THEORY AND HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011) (analyzing the theory and history of international 
law from the Middle Ages to the present); GUSTAVO GOZZI, DIRITTI E CIVILTÀ. STORIA E FILOSOFIA DEL 
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (2010)(examining the evolution of international law from the XVIth century 
onward); Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.) TIME, HISTORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) (identifying and discussing different ways in which the relationship between 
international law and (its) history may be conceived); LUIS FERNANDO ALVAREZ LONDOÑO, LA HISTORIA 
DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO (2006)(covering the history of international law from antiquity to 
the XXth century); PÉTER KOVÁCS (ed.), HISTORIA ANTE PORTAS—L’HISTOIRE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
– HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004)(discussing the evolution of selected international law doctrines, 
cases, and institutions); RAM PRAKASH ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HISTORY: AN ASIAN 
PERSPECTIVE (2004)(criticizing the Eurocentrism of international law and proposing a different perspective); 
SLIM LAGHMANI, HISTOIRE DU DROIT DES GENS, DU JUS GENTIUM IMPÉRIAL AU JUS PUBLICUM EUROPÆUM 
(2004)(investigating the global evolution of the law of nations from antiquity to the end of World War I); 
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1870–1960 (2002) (placing the origins of international law in the 19th century); CARLO FOCARELLI, 
LEZIONI DI STORIA DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (2002)(examining the evolution of international law from 
antiquity to the present); WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000) (English 
translation of EPOCHEN DER VÖLKERRECHTSGESCHICHTE (1984) (dividing the history of international law 
into periods characterized by the hegemony of specific powers); A. TRUYOL Y SERRA, HISTORIA DEL 
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO (1998) (adopting a universalist approach to the history of international 
law, influenced by the axiom ubi societas inter potestates, ibi iusgentium, and transcending the Eurocentric 
framework of the Westphalian state-centered narrative). For an earlier study, see ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A 
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (1947) (focusing on diplomacy and treaty relations); JOHAN 
H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 12 vol. (Brill 1968–1998)(considering 
international law by subject matter). For a general bibliography, see Peter Macalister-Smith and J. Schwietzke, 
Literature and Documentary Sources relating to the History of International Law, 1 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999) 136. 
13  See JUS GENTIUM—JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY, the first dedicated journal in the 
United States addressing the history of international law, launched in January 2016 (“encourag[ing] further 
exploration in the archives, but welcoming the continued reassessment of international legal history in all of 
its dimensions”) http://www.lawbookexchange.com/jus-gentium.php (last visited 20 September 2016). See 
also JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, launched in 1999; Ronald Macdonald, Editorial, 1 
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1999) 1 (noting that the Journal of the History of 
International Law aims at “contribut[ing] to the effort to make intelligible the international legal past, 
however varied and eccentric it may be, to stimulate interest in the whys, the whats and the wheres of 
international legal development, without projecting present relationships upon the past”). 
14 See, e.g., Amanda Alexander, A Short History of International Humanitarian Law, EUROPEAN J. INT’L L 26 
(2015) 109–138 (arguing that “international humanitarian law is not simply an ahistorical code, managed by 
states and promoted by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Rather, it is a relatively new and 
historically contingent field that has been created, shaped and dramatically reinterpreted by a variety of actors, 
both traditional and unconventional”) and Ziv Bohrer, International Criminal Law’s Millennium of Forgotten 
History, LAW AND HISTORY REV. 34 (2016), 393–485 (challenging the consensus that International Criminal 
Law (ICL) was “born” at Nuremberg, and arguing that ICL’s history spans centuries). 
15 See e.g. PETER H. SAND, THE HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2015); 
Jeanrique Fahner, The Contested History of International Investment Law—From a Problematic Past to Current 




inquiry. Scholars have increasingly researched the historical background of institutions,16 
mapped the evolution of key concepts,17 or narrated the history of the discipline.18 “Even 
in the absence of a grand theory about why or how one should go about it,” scholars write 
about the history of international law whether they see themselves as scholars of both 
history and international law, scholars of history who happen to study international law, 
international lawyers who happen to study history, or “scholars in some other discipline 
entirely who happen to study history and law, or scholars who are resistant to disciplinary 
categorization altogether.”19 
Two distinct converging phenomena have contributed to the renaissance of international 
legal history: the ‘historical turn’ in international law and the ‘international turn’ of legal 
history. The expression ‘historical turn in international law’ “refers to a constant and 
growing need on the part of international lawyers to review … the history of international 
law and to establish links between the past and the present situation of international norms, 
institutions and doctrines.”20  
International law has become increasingly important and governs almost any aspect of 
‘life, universe and everything.’21 The proliferation of international law and its governance of 
almost any field of human activity have been accompanied by some growth pains and 
required some reflection as to the origins, aims and objectives of the discipline.22 History is 
increasingly viewed as a relevant method of understanding and improving on international 
law. International lawyers increasingly pay attention to the history of international law in 
the quest for the meaning, sense, and legitimacy and/or contestation of the discipline. In 
turn, the history of international law has provided them with a sense of identity, inspiration, 
and continuity in some cases, or unease, rage, and disruption in others. However, it has 
also raised a number of interpretative challenges. In some cases, investigating the history of 
international law has been like opening a Pandora’s box. Far from finding clear-cut, black 
or white answers to their legitimacy conundrum, international lawyers have found multi-
layered complexity, conflicting accounts, and diverging interpretations of past events. This 
opening of new frontiers has created new opportunities of critical reflection and ongoing 
research.  
                                               
16 See, e.g., ANTONIO R. PARRA, A HISTORY OF ICSID (2012) (narrating the origins and evolution of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes). 
17  See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 16 (2003) 69 
(analyzing the evolution of the concept of transitional justice); Philip Alston, Does the Past Matter? On the 
Origins of Human Rights, HARVARD LAW REVIEW 126 (2013) 2043 (analysing competing histories of the origins 
of international human rights law). 
18 See, e.g., KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT, 
AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL (2013) (delineating investment law’s origins in the quest for imperial 
control over the resources and peoples of the colonized world); CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: 
PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1985) (investigating 
how investors have protected their investments abroad in the nineteenth and twentieth century); ANTHONY 
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) (narrating the 
history of international law from the perspective of the non-European). 
19 Catherine L. Fisk and Robert W. Gordon, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in Legal History, UC IRVINE L. 
REV. 1 (2011) 519–541, at 523–4 (adding, at 523, that “it is perfectly possible, and indeed very common, to 
write first-rate history uninformed by a grand theory”). 
20 George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo, Martti Koskenniemi and the Historiographical Turn in International Law, EUR. 
J. INT’L L 16 (2005), 539–559, 541 (arguing that Koskenniemi’s THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS “led to 
a historiographical turn in Koskenniemi’s work and has … encouraged a historiographical turn in the field of 
international law as a whole”). 
21 I am borrowing this expression from Catherine Redgwell, Life, Universe and Everything: A Critique of 
Anthropocentric Rights, in Alan Boyle and M. Anderson (eds.) HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1996) 71. 
22 Martti Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Significance and Problems for a Critical View, 27 TEMPLE 
INT’L&COMP.L.J. (2013) 215 (“what seems needed is a better understanding of how we have come to where 




The jurist’s history has been promising, albeit it still remains beleagured with traditional 
assumptions. Often international lawyers equate the history of international law with 
international law. However, the two fields remain conceptually distinct. International legal 
history and international law are not the same thing: international legal history narrates the 
historical evolution of international law, while international law is the output of such 
development and broadly indicates the law governing transnational relations. International 
lawyers’ histories often lack any reference to non-legal sources, including historical sources. 
Not rarely, international lawyers have authored ‘histories’ of their field, relying almost 
completely on lawyerly accounts, as if the history of international law was a self-contained 
regime, completely detached from history itself. However, the matter is very much in flux. 
Some international lawyers have adopted a more reflexive approach to the field and various 
methods to successfully overcome the disciplinary boundaries of international law and 
enter into the world of international legal history.23 Others have conducted painstaking 
work in archives to map too long neglected jurisprudence. 
In parallel, the term ‘international turn of legal history’ refers to the growing interest of 
historians for global phenomena. 24  Why are legal historians interested in transnational 
phenomena? Historians of law have taken global phenomena, such as imperialism and 
subsequent decolonization, more seriously for two principal reasons. First, globalization 
has led to the realization that domestic histories are a component of global histories and 
that they participate in and reflect their broader contexts. Second, international law and 
comparative law have become more important in legal education. In most countries, legal 
education has become more internationalized. 25  Because international law has grown 
tremendously in breadth and importance, legal historians have gradually started 
investigating its origins and evolution.   
Characterized by historical investigation, archival research and a variety of 
historiographical methods, the historians’ history of international law has been 
quantitatively limited, producing only a few pieces of work, but qualitatively impactful.26 By 
unveiling archival information, mapping intellectual networks, contextualizing legal texts in 
their historical background, the legal historians’ histories have contributed depth to the 
field.    
                                               
23  Alexandra Kemmerer, Völkerrechtsgeschichten – Histories of International Law, EJIL: TALK! January 6, 2015 
(pinpointing that “historians and lawyers discuss, debate and dispute (their) histories of international law” and 
highlighting the need of  “intellectual encounters and spaces for conflict and cooperation that will in turn 
challenge and promote reflexive disciplinarity in the respective fields. Of crucial importance here is the 
researcher’s awareness of her own position and situatedness”). 
24  DAVID ARMITAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT (2013) 17 (noting the 
“international turn in intellectual history”). 
25 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The International Dimension of Law School Curriculum, 22 PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW REVIEW, (2004) 417, 418 (arguing that legal education should “teach students not only to to be 
boundary-crossers but to be cosmopolitan”). 
26 See e.g. Randall C.H. Lesaffer, International Law and Its History: The Story of an Unrequited Love, in Matthew 
Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.), TIME, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) 
27–41, 29 (identifying the history of international law as ‘an interdisciplinary subject with two natural 
constituencies: international lawyers and legal historians’); Randall C.H. Lesaffer, The Classical Law of Nations 
(1500-1800) in Alexander Orakhelashvili (Ed.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011) 408-440 (examining the evolution of international law from the sixteenth 
century to the nineteenth century); Randall Lesaffer, The Grotian Tradition Revisited: Change and Continuity in the 
History of International Law, BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 73 (2002) 103-139, 103 (noting that 
‘For a long time, the history of the law of nations has been neglected by legal historians and over-simplified 
and distorted by international lawyers’); Alain Wijffels, Early Modern Scholarship and International Law, in 
Alexander Orakhelashvili (Ed.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011) 23–60, 23 (examining the development of international law scholarship from 
the 16th until the 18th century). 
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Moreover, after the Cold War, the increasing accessibility of historical sources has made it 
more possible to do insightful, reliable and ground-breaking research. The opening of long-
classified archives has enabled access to materials not available before. The digitization of 
resources and their accessibility online has also facilitated access to the same. 
In conclusion, history matters. As the French medieval historian and Resistance leader 
Marc Bloch pointed out, knowledge of the past enables our understanding of the present.27 
As in other eras of major political, economic and cultural upheaval, history is perceived as a 
master key to understanding the past and the present, as well as to providing new 
perspectives.28 Like other linkages such as law and anthropology,29 law and geography,30 law 
and literature,31 and law and culture,32  law and history provides new views and a tool kit to 
understanding the international legal system. It can “unravel [international law’s] blind 
spots, biases and … hidden emancipatory potentials.”33 Hence, the history of international 
law “constitutes a major field of inquiry for those engaging critically with international 
law.”34 Not only can the history of international law explain the features of the current 
international legal framework,35 but it can also provide a critical lens through which to 
investigate the past and envisage the future of the field. 
 
2. The History of International Law as a Battlefield 
 
Two visions of history compete in the making of international legal history. On the one 
hand, international lawyers are naturally driven to explore the origins of their discipline, 
and tend to investigate the field using traditional international legal interpretive tools. They 
“value the ‘historical pedigree’ of legal concepts, and mine the past in search for precedents 
and customs.” 36  Yet, they lack awareness of historiographical methods, and this has 
                                               
27  MARC BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN’S CRAFT (Peter Putnam trans.) (1992), at 43 (noting that 
“[m]isunderstanding of the present is the inevitable consequence of ignorance of the past,” while one cannot 
“understand the past, if he is totally ignorant of the present”). 
28 Hoffmann, Human Rights and History, at 26. 
29 Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and International Law, ANNUAL REV. OF ANTHROPOLOGY 35 (2006) 99–116 
(showing “how anthropological theory helps social scientists, activists, and lawyers understand how 
international law is produced and how it works”). 
30 LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1460–
1900 (2010)(approaching world history by examining the relation of law and geography in European empires 
between 1400 and 1900); Upendra V. Baxi, Some Newly Emergent Geographies of Injustice: Boundaries and Borders in 
International Law, INDIANA J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23 (2016) 15–37 (examining the interplay between 
the boundaries in international law and the production of geographies of injustice); Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial 
Cartographies, the Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending War Along the 
Afghanistan–Pakistan Frontier BROOKLYN J INT’L L 36 (2010) 1–74, 73 (noting that the colonial rule 
“reconfigured space” and that these territorial demarcations “often cut across age-old cultural and historical 
social units,” thus determining “a host of endemic political and security afflictions”); Daniel Bethlehem, The 
End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the International System and the Challenge to International Law, EUROPEAN J. 
INT’L L 25, (2014) 9–24 (looking at the changing place of geography in the international system and the 
challenges that this poses to international law). 
31 See CHRISTOPHER N. WARREN, LITERATURE & THE LAW OF NATIONS (2015) (charting a new literary 
history of international law); Matthew Windsor, Narrative Kill or Capture: Unreliable Narration in International 
Law, LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 28 (2015), 743–769 (evaluating the benefits of a “turn to narration” in international 
legal scholarship). 
32 RICHARD NED LEBOW, A CULTURAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2008) (examining the 
influence of culture and identity on the development of international political order). 
33 Ntina Tzouvala, New Approaches to International Law: The History of a Project, EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 27 (2016) 
215–233 (reflecting upon critical international scholarship), at 224. 
34 Id. 
35 Matthew Dyson, If the Present were the Past, AMERICAN J. OF LEGAL HISTORY 56 (2016), 41–52, at 50 (noting 
that “the historical connection allows us to see the inner substance of the present”). 
36 Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 




affected the quality of some of their historical inquiries. Lack of consultation of primary 
sources and limited engagement with secondary historical sources have also contributed to 
make some of the histories of international law, as narrated by international lawyers, 
fundamentally flawed. Moreover, most international lawyers consider international law as 
the product of “progress in the evolution of ideas.”37 By presuming that international law is 
a force for good, international law scholars often assume that its progress is underway.38 
They “have little appreciation for detailed contextualisation”. 39  They tend to adopt 
genealogical, and a-historical approaches “to generate data and interpretations that are of 
use in resolving modern legal controversies.”40 Yet, genealogical and a-historical histories 
of international law can “lead to anachronistic interpretations of historical phenomena” 
and neglect their historical context.41  
On the other hand, legal historians claim that the history of international law is just a 
subfield of legal history and, therefore, requires the adoption of historiographical methods. 
They disfavor the ‘idea of a usable past’ and focus on ‘the pastness of the past.’42 They aim 
to “understand the past … for what it meant to the people living in it” rather than “for 
what it brought about”.43 In their narratives, they look for ‘alternative paths’, ‘roads not 
taken’, and “elective affinities that do not seem to be obvious connections.” 44  The 
perceived downsides of this focus are: 1) the possible lack of focus and/or expertise on 
issues that are perceived as crucial by international lawyers; 2) painstaking attention to 
historical details and data which may seem irrelevant to international lawyers; and 3) little if 
any attention to the current relevance of international legal history.  
Therefore, a turf war has erupted between ‘historians’ and ‘lawyers’ on what kind of 
history of international law we could and/or should have. Far from being a merely 
theoretical debate, with little or any practical impact,45 this is a struggle for the soul of 
international legal history, and arguably international law itself, that has transformed the 
                                               
37 Philip Alston, Book Review – Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights, HARVARD L. REV. 126 
(2013) 2043–2081, at 2063 (noting that “international law scholars have long been accused of portraying their 
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38  See e.g. Ian Hurd, Enchanted and Disenchanted International Law, GLOBAL POLICY 7 (2016) 96–101, at 96 
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39 Marcus M. Payk, The History of International Law – or International Law in History? A Reply to Alexandra Kemmerer 
and Jochen von Bernstorff, EJIL: TALK!, January 8, 2015 (pinpointing that “those who see international law as a 
force for good per se and who are interested only in tracing the success story of its development will have 
little appreciation for detailed contextualisation.”) 
40  Kalman, Border Patrol, at 115; Steven Wilf, Law/Text/Past, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 543 (2011) at 553 
(examining legal historians’ complex relationship with text); Anne Orford, On International Legal Method, 
LONDON REV. INT’L L. 1 (2013) 166–197, 171 (noting that “anachronism is today treated as a ‘sin against the 
holy spirit of history’.” But arguing that law resists easy temporal divisions as “judges, advocates, scholars and 
students all look to past texts precisely to discover the nature of present obligations?”) 
41 Randall Lesaffer, International Law and Its History: a History of Unrequited Love, in Matthew Craven, Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.) TIME, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004), 27–41 at 34–35. 
42 Kalman, Border Patrol, at 114. 
43 Lesaffer, International Law and Its History, at 34–35; See also Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Ideas, 8 HISTORY AND THEORY (1969) 3–53, 28 (cautioning against the dangers of “approaching 
materials with preconceived paradigms” as a “form of conceptual parochialism” and of “writing historical 
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44 Wilf, Law/Text/Past, at 558. 




field into a battlefield.46 It is not only about methods, form and procedure, but also about 
substance, aims and objectives of international legal history. Such clash is “a struggle for 
interpretive power,” with the resulting ability to impose a hegemonic discourse and 
domesticate “divergent narrative visions.” 47  The outcome of this debate is important 
because, far from simply determing the form of legal research, it will likely influence the 
types of questions/investigations of the same. Moreover, the history of international law 
can influence the evolution of international law itself and become an instrument of power. 
The debate between historians and lawyers has taken place in various areas of 
international law. One example is human rights law. International lawyers and legal 
historians debate whether genealogy matter in human rights law. While international 
lawyers adopt a genealogical approach, and agree that human rights have an old pedigree 
eventually acquiring different political and legal meanings over time,48 legal historians see 
them as a contingent phenomenon.49  
On the one hand, human rights lawyers tend to trace the origins of human rights back to 
the origins of human history itself. For instance, adopting a distinctively genealogical 
approach, which characterizes international lawyers’ histories, several international lawyers 
have assimilated ideas of ‘rights’, as mentioned in the abolitionist debates, to current 
meanings of ‘human rights’, arguing that the abolition movement was an early victory for 
human rights.50 While other international lawyers admit that there are differences between 
the use of ‘rights’ in earlier centuries and today,they agree that genealogical and analytical 
approaches matter. 51 
 On the other hand, legal historians consider that the past should not be read as a mere 
precursor of the present and are wary of genealogical frameworks. For instance, for Moyn, 
human rights emerged in 1977, because “they were widely understood as a moral 
alternative to bankrupt political utopias”, such as socialism, communism and nationalism.52 
Accordingly, the human rights movement would be “of such recent provenance as to lack 
                                               
46 Jenny S. Martinez, Human Rights and History, HARVARD L. REV. FORUM 126 (2012) 221, 239 (noting that 
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47 Windsor, Narrative Kill or Capture, 743. 
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64; MARK FREEMAN AND GIBRAN VAN ERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2004), 19; JIM IFE, 
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50 See, e.g.,  JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW (2012) 6 (suggesting that “slave courts were the first international human rights courts’) and 13 (arguing 
that ‘the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade remains the most successful episode ever in the history of 
international human rights law”)); Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human 
Rights Law, 117 YALE L. J. 550, 550 (2008)(contending that international courts for the suppression of the 
slave trade established under bilateral treaties between Britain and other countries between 1817 and 1871 
were the first international human rights courts). See also SEYMOUR DRESCHER, CAPITALISM AND 
ANTISLAVERY: BRITISH MOBILIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1986) x (considering abolitionism—
the historical movement to end the slave trade— as “the first and, in a narrow sense, the most successful 
human rights movement”). 
51 Alston, Does the Past Matter? 2077 (noting “the intrinsic polycentricity of the human rights enterprise.”) and 
2063 (cautioning that international legal historians should not move “from one historical moment to another” 
without showing causality, verifying continuity, or considering the historical context. For Alston, they should 
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a genealogy worthy of the name”.53 Moyn’s theory has been described as the big bang 
theory of human rights, evoking the idea of rights emerging suddenly from nothingness.54 
Moyn’s path-breaking monograph, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, relies on two 
conceptual steps. First, Moyn articulates some major criticisms to the lawyers’ history of 
international law (pars destruens). Human rights may currently be “so firmly entrenched in 
our moral landscape that it is almost impossible for us to imagine what an alternative 
landscape would look like,” but this may not have always been the case.55 Moyn cautions 
not to read history through the lenses of the present with insight, but to read it through the 
lenses of the past for what it was. 56  Second, he develops a thought-provoking (albeit 
debated) theory about the origins of the current notion of human rights (pars costruens). He 
argues that the contemporary meaning of human rights emerged only in the 1970s.57 Such 
provocative iconoclasm has two major merits. First, it “revitalized the historical study of 
human rights by contesting the relevance of a long-term perspective.” 58  Second, it 
compelled a deep and healthy rethinking of the history of international law. While Moyn 
may be stretching the argument to a breaking point in his pars construens discussion, he 
deserves praise for  raising fundamental methodological issues in the pars destruens of his 
work, which can be summarised as follows: the past should not be read as a mere precursor 
of the present.  
  
This framing dichotomy—the clash between lawyers’ histories and historians’ histories—
is an analytical effort to depict the heart of the matter. It delineates competing Weberian 
ideal types,59 that is, conceptual tools for the scrutiny and systematic characterization of 
how scholars approach the history of international law. The divide represents a valuable 
methodological tool to achieve a deeper understanding of how the relevant epistemic 
communities—international lawyers and legal historians—approach the history of 
international law. The splitting-in-half is not meant to be an accurate description of how 
each scholar approaches the field. Rather, it functions as a research tool for scrutiny, 
classification, and comparison. It highlights that most scholars struggle to find a proper 
language in narrating the histories of international law and that there is a dialectical 
relationship or dialogue between its constituencies.  
As the dichotomy between historians’ histories and lawyers’ histories is not a description 
of reality but is a construct to understand and analyze the history of international law, no 
scholar fits neatly within given categories. By no means are the historiographical methods 
of the history of international law endorsed by legal historians only. Rather, several 
international lawyers have adopted historiographical approaches and/or cautioned purely 
legalistic approaches to international legal history.60 For instance, Martti Koskenniemi, has 
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nowhere in 1977” as the “big bang theory of human rights”); Martinez, Human Rights and History, at 237 
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55 Adam Etinson, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 34 (2012), 294, 296 
(reviewing Moyn’s THE LAST UTOPIA and suggesting that “rather than worrying about how we might 
preserve the utopian status of human rights into the future, … [we should] allow human rights to simply 
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57 MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA, at 43 (offering a “broken history of human rights”). 
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59  Susan J. Hekman, Weber’s Ideal Type: A Contemporary Reassessment, POLITY 16 (1983), 119, 119 (arguing that 
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adopted multiple approaches to the history of international law in his works.61 By the same 
token, some legal historians have adopted a conceptual approach to history.62 To sum up, 
scholars attempt to bridge the gap between the historians’ histories and the lawyers’ 
histories adopting different approaches.  
 
3.    What Kind of History of International Law Should We Have?  
 
The flourishing of international legal history prompts us to reflect on what kind of history 
of international law we should have. Should one be concerned with the historical record or 
its legal afterglow? Should legal historians be cognizant of current international law? Is 
there anything to be gained by developing a primarily legal rather than historical method in 
writing the history of international law? Should juridical thinking frame the issues the 
author raises and shape the archival choices she makes throughout her research and the 
construction of her narrative?63 In parallel, should international law scholars be cognizant 
of historical method(s)? If so, which historical method suits their research better? Should 
they focus on the history of institutions and concepts or rather prefer the biographical 
genre, studying the lives of prominent legal scholars? Should they look at the context in 
which international law came into being? Can we expect them to visit archives and critically 
engage with historical sources? Is the history of international law a sui generis field of study 
which in fact requires ad hoc methods and approaches? I   
In order to address these questions, this section proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the 
converging divergences of international law and legal history. If one reasonably accepts the 
equivalence between international law and legal history, ideally, both should have equal 
footing in mapping the history of international law. Therefore, it is vital to examine their 
respective subject matters, languages, and cultures.64 Second, this section illustrates the four 
dimensions of international legal historiography: 1) global/local; 2) internal/external; 3) 
diachronic/synchronic; and 4) micro/macro. It then concludes discussing the discernible 
trends of international legal history across these various dimensions. 
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64 Gerry Simpson, The Sentimental Life of International Law, LONDON REV. INT’L L. 3 (2015) 3–29, 6 (noting that 
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International law and legal history diverge on a number of issues, including subject matter, 
language and culture. Whereas international law constitutes a well-established and 
flourishing area of law that governs international relations. legal history studies the 
evolution of law and the reasons for change.65 What matters to a lawyer can be irrelevant 
for the historian, and vice versa.66   
International law scholars and practitioners generally adopt a deliberately lucid, objective, 
and terse language, 67  relying on the use and re-use of terms in a rather conservative 
fashion.68  In fact, “[e]xcept in hard cases, the law doesn’t reward creativity. It rewards logic 
and experience”.69 Whether it is displayed in norms or briefs or academic works, such 
language is an instrument of persuasion and power, often claiming to be definitive, 
“inevitable in [its] conclusions”70 and thus preventing “more emancipatory or dissident” 
discourses about the international order. 71  For instance, the use of apparently 
interchangeable terms such as autonomy and self-determination can dilute or overstate 
given claims. 72  The language of historians differs from law, as it bypasses legal 
technicalities, 73  requires some literary qualities 74  and “the ability to convey a vivid 
representation of characters and situations.” 75  Moreover, historians are aware of the 
contingent nature of their writings, that their historical accounts “never exhaus[t] all future 
possibility”.76 
International law scholars and practitioners share an identifiable cultural capital, i.e. “a 
certain way of understanding … the world.”77 International lawyers “look to the past for 
authority” and often assume that “there is continuity between past and present”.78  By 
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67 Simpson, The Sentimental Life of International Law, 11 (noting that legal scholars have tended “to express 
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Accommodation of Conflicting Rights. By Hurst Hannum. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990. AMERICAN 
J. INT’L L. 85 (1991) 731–32 (criticizing Hannum’s monograph for “his discussions of international legal 
history” and for “assum[ing] that history is not an intrinsically tragic clash of irreconcilables,” as well as for 
his “preference for “autonomy,” … rel[ying] on established state power as the persistent structuring element 
of international law and society”). 
73 Kemmerer, Völkerrechtsgeschichten – Histories of International Law (noting that “[h]istorians … don’t like the 
technicalities, the complex institutional architectures, the intricate cases and convoluted judgements.”) *** 
this is a blog, it does not contain page numbers ***  
74 Hayden White, The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory, 23 HISTORY AND THEORY (1984) 1 
(arguing that historians’ narratives of the past are based on literary models and that historians resort to 
literature to convey meaning to their history). 
75 Carlo Ginzburg, Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian, CRITICAL INQUIRY 18 (1991), 79–92 79 
(noting that for centuries “history and law has been very close”, and highlighting the convergences and 
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contrast, legal historians examine the past in its context. Often ‘skeptical of theory,’79 they 
rely upon empirical and inferential methods.80 They gather information from dusty archives 
often “scattered across vast distances,”81  with restrictive access policies and short opening 
hours. Their narratives are “often said to be provisional, insofar as further research in the 
archives might … demand revisions.”82  Despite having been described as ‘a dry and dusty 
subject’,83 as well as ‘nonprofessional’ in its development,84 legal history nevertheless has 
quite a long tradition.  
Yet, these divergences should not be overstated. There are interesting convergences 
between international law and history.85 Both historians and lawyers are required to offer 
reconstructions of past events.86 Whereas lawyers’ writings do not have a literary aim, their 
texts “can have literary qualities.”87 Moreover,several international lawyers have benefitted 
from historiographical insights, andIntellectual legal historians share methodological 
affinities with international lawyers focusing on the genealogy or evolution of concepts and 
investigating the status quo ante, the status quo, and the future of given ideas.88 
However, as most international lawyers are not historians by training and, in parallel, 
most historians do not have in-depth expertise in international law, doubts remain as to the 
proper methodology to be adopted.  This Article does not take a position on whether a 
given history of international law is better than another; rather it highlights that several 
histories of international law can and have been written, and illustrates a range of available 
methods. Despite its flourishing, the history of international law is still in search of a 
proper methodology. Should one stick to intra-disciplinary approaches, working within the 
boundaries of only one discipline, be it international law or legal history? Or should we 
endorse a comprehensive and inter-disciplinary stance, enabling international lawyers and 
legal historians to work together in mapping out the history of international law? Or, 
rather, should one adopt post-disciplinary approaches abandoning existing disciplines in 
order to ‘think beyond old boundaries’?89 
While it seems clear that “historians have no monopoly on the past,”90 it is also clear that 
international law scholars have no monopoly on the past of international law. Rather, this 
Article suggests that the history of international law is an interdisciplinary field that bridges 
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the interest of both historians and international law scholars.91 Historians and international 
lawyers should “ris[e] above their traditional antagonism”92 and write international legal 
history that is of relevance to both international lawyers and legal historians alike.93 
In order to transcend the borders of pure international law or legal history analysis, one 
needs to be aware of the four dimensions of international legal historiography: 1) 
local/global; 2) internal/external; 3) diachronic/synchronic; and 4) micro/macro.  
First, international legal history can be ‘local,’ focusing on domestic and/or regional 
trajectories of international legal history, or ‘global,’ that is ‘a de-centered … perspective, 
detached as far as possible, from the concrete circumstances and the national identity of 
the observer”.94 Although international legal history by definition focuses on international 
legal facts, for a long time it adopted a Eurocentric focus.95 To counter this hegemonic 
discourse, local and global approaches to international legal history aim to overcome the 
traditional Eurocentrism of the history of international law..96 Only recently have scholars 
approached the history of international law illustrating the contribution of other regions to 
its making.97 Among these approaches, global history promotes ‘a de-centered’ perspective 
focusing on the interactions between peoples rather than states. 98  Global/local legal 
histories do not necessarily replace the traditional dichotomy between national and 
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92 Id. at 118. 
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Galindo, Force Field: On History and Theory of International Law, 93 (pinpointing that “studies on the way 
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(1850–1950) (2012) 10 (suggesting that international law is not purely of European making; arguing that 
extra-European countries did not passively receive a ‘European international law’ but re-shaped such rules 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988) (illustrating the importance of Africa in the history of international law); Arnulf 
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international legal histories. While domestic history of law is a matter for legal historians; 
international legal histories can also present a national component. National histories of 
international law are international legal histories narrated from the perspective of the 
nation’s foreign policy, including “the domestic laws and treaty-arrangements that regulate 
the conduct of external relations.”99  
Such trends toward local/global histories have both promises and pitfalls. On the one 
hand, they can map the histories of international law in a pluralistic way.100 Moreover, they 
open the door to analysis as to the role played by non-state actors in the history of 
international law.101 On the other hand, how to relate the local and the global and how to 
overcome epistemic biases remain significant challenges.102 
Second, international legal history can be ‘internal’ or ‘external.’ While ‘internal’ 
international legal history “stays as much as possible within the box of distinctive-
appearing legal things,” relying on legal sources and depicting legal matters, external 
international legal history relies on interdisciplinary approaches, for instance focusing on 
the interplay between legal matters and “the social context of law and its social effects.” 103 
So far internal legal history has predominated.104 In the sixties, the Italian historiographer, 
Arnaldo Momigliano, famously contended that legal historians should not write solely from 
an internal perspective. Rather, he argued that since law is a social phenomenon, its history 
should investigate the interplay between law and its context.105  
Nowadays both international lawyers and legal historians seem to regard ‘self-contained 
legal history’ as outdated.106 There is an emerging “recognition that meaningful legal history 
must be more than … internal history.”107 If law is a ‘mirror of society’, legal history cannot 
be separated from law’s context. 108  However, some eclecticism is possible and even 
desirable.109 For instance, “[o]ne need not choose between … internal and external legal 
histories.”110 Rather, “[t]he conventional sources of legal history—judicial opinions, statutes, 
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treatises, … pleadings and … court records … —” can appear “alongside conventional 
sources of intellectual and social history—.”111 
Third, international legal history can be synchronic or diachronic. Legal history is 
‘synchronic’ when it investigates legal issues as they exist at one point in time without 
reference to their evolution. Legal history is ‘diachronic’ when it studies legal phenomena 
as they change in the long term, the long durée.112 Most historians, except for intellectual 
historians studying the history of ideas and looking at the development of concepts,113 
generally adopt a synchronic approach, stressing that “the past is … different from the 
present.” 114  For historians, “the past is a foreign country; they do things differently 
there.”115  
By contrast, international lawyers prefer a diachronic approach, considering law and 
history as necessarily entangled. They focus on a given legal concept and study its 
evolution. The language of international law has “a strong genealogical or ancestral 
component,” “in the sense that one generation has provided the foundation or the impetus 
for the emergence and shaping of the next generation’s usage.”116 International lawyers 
look for continuity with the past. One of the sources of international law—customary 
law—is based on state practice and thus requires international lawyers to look at past 
conduct. Although there is no binding precedent in international law, international law 
courts and tribunals do refer to past cases.  
While a diachronic approach characterises the toolkit of international lawyers when they 
deal with international law, questions arise as to whether such approach remains sound 
when dealing with the history of international law. International law scholars and 
practitioners have started questioning the sacrality of diachronic approaches within the 
history of international law. 117  Such diachronic approaches may foreclose in depth 
understanding of the meaning of given events or legal texts.118 However, questions arise as 
to the possibility of a purely synchronic study of international legal history. In fact, as 
Koskenniemi points out, “a clear separation between the object of historical research and 
the researcher’s own context cannot be sustained; … the study of history is unavoidably—
and fruitfully—conditioned by the historian’s … pre-understandings, conceptual frames 
and interest[s].”119  
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Fourth, international legal history can be micro or macro. Micro-history typically involves 
“a reduction of scale” and focuses on given events or anecdotes or individuals rather than 
epochal events.120 Far from constituting mere case studies, micro-histories aim to ask big 
questions in small places. Despite their small scale, such stories allegedly epitomize the 
behaviors, logics, and motives characterizing a given society.121 These anecdotes “typically 
bridge the worlds of literature and history.”122 Albeit to a limited extent, international legal 
historians have mined small episodes, often discovered serendipitously, for insights into 
major themes of international legal history.123 While the move to investigate micro-histories 
is only recent, its potential is only gradually unfolding.124 Not only is there a growing 
interest in international law scholars and practitioners, whose biographies make great 
subject of micro-histories, but there is a growing interest in linking institutions, concepts 
and international legal scholars to their milieu. The small-scale enables researchers to look 
at given topics from new underresearched angles and provide in depth analysis even of the 
historical smaller details (minutiae).125 However, such an approach has also some pitfalls, 
including the difficulty of selecting a subject suitable matter for inquiry, dealing with scarce 
evidence and gaps in the data, and remaining relevant to a broad audience.  
In turn, macro-history seeks out large, long-term trends in international legal history, 
looking at multiple events and concepts over the course of centuries.126 It studies the past 
on large scales. Most international legal histories have focused on large historical events 
and their legal outputs.127 But the fact that macro-historical approaches have predominated 
in the field of international legal history does not mean that it should necessarily be the 
case in the future. This approach often loses sight of local and individual contributions to 
international legal history.  
Therefore, macro-histories and micro-histories are complementary. 128  Their 
complementarity is highlighted by what historians call the ‘issue of framing’: “In writing, as 
in an art gallery, frames determine what we see and how we see it. By telling us what is 
inside and what is outside they suggest what is and what is not important. So frames can 
hide at least as much as they reveal.”129 Therefore, investigating international legal history 
through both micro and macrohistorical frames “ought to offer a richer, fuller and more 
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coherent understanding of the past in general”.130 Moreover, international legal historians 
may well need to “mov[e] back and forth between a wider and a narrower scale in order to 
gradually come to a clearer view of [their] object.”131 
Are there discernible trends of international legal history across these various 
dimensions? For decades, if not for centuries, the history of international law has been 
Eurocentric. Since the decolonization process took off, this assumption has given way to 
more comprehensive and inclusive histories of international law.132 In the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, legal history—both national and international—used to be largely 
‘internal.’ 133 More recently, however, eminent scholars have stressed the need to broaden 
the types of sources and to adopt a more interdisciplinary stance in order to locate given 
historical events within a broader context.134  
Until recently, while legal historians privileged a synchronic approach to the history of 
international law, international law scholars privileged a diachronic approach to the same, 
focusing on the genealogy of given legal concepts and assuming continuity between legal 
scholarship of earlier periods and contemporary international law. 135  International law 
scholars argued for the specificity of law; law is a peculiar “discipline in which judges, 
advocates, scholars and students all look to past texts precisely to discover the nature of 
present obligations.”136 However, legal historians have criticized the genealogical approach 
for leading to anachronistic results, for not taking into account historical complexity and 
“the basic rules of historical methodology.” 137 If the diachronic approach works well for 
the study of international law, this does not necessarily mean that it works well for making 
the history of international law. While “lawyers … are trained in the art of making meaning 
move across time,”138 doubts remain as to whether anachronism should/can have any role 
in the making of international legal history. The diachronic/synchronic conundrum can be 
solved by carefully selecting an appropriate historiographical method. 
 
4.    Historiographical Methods  
 
Methodology—the analysis of the methods applied to a field of study—“involve[s] key 
decisions about what and how we read, the nature of the material with which we engage, 
[and] how we conduct our research.”139 Why should one bother about the method(s) of 
international legal history? One could contend that any historiographical debate “not only 
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fails to enhance, but actively threatens the practice of history.” 140  Accordingly, to do 
history, one “should forget theory and get on with the business of doing history.” 141 
Following this line of argument, if any guidance was needed for determining how to write 
international legal history, one could look at the work of peers.142 In a nutshell, trying too 
hard to understand the history of international law would prevent one from appreciating 
just how interesting the history of international law really is.143 
The problem with this apparently liberal approach is that if one adopts it, she will be left 
in a muddy zone of uncertainty and confusion as to the best way(s) to proceed. Reference 
to the works of peers can be illuminating, but the current literature is rather fragmented, 
given the extraordinary expansion of international law to cover fields as diverse as 
international criminal law, international economic law, the law of the sea, and others. 
Scholars often fail to explicitly acknowledge the method they adopt. This is not to say that 
method is irrelevant to their work, just that often they take it for granted. Moreover, recent 
methodological debates, as illustrated in section 2, can make it difficult to draw sound 
conclusions about the lessons to be learned from the debate. 
Therefore, mapping and critically assessing the available methods of international legal 
historiography is a useful, timely, and crucial endeavor. Not only can it clarify the range of 
available options, but it also enables the researcher to identify the best method(s) for 
pursuing her research objectives. A scrutiny of the available methods does not replace 
creative effort with a pre-determined path; rather, it aims to contribute to the 
understanding of the field and empower the international legal historian to devise an 
appropriate method to address given research questions. It is like providing a map: not 
only is one free to select possible destinations, but she is also free to choose possible 
routes. No  single paradigm dominates the historiography of international law. Rather, 
there is an array of methods by which international legal historians can do their work. 
While this Article may not provide the ultimate map, and other maps are possible, it 
certainly constitutes an original contribution to the emerging field of the history of 
international law, which may facilitate further research in the field and/or open fruitful 
debates.  
    While this section offers a significant sample of historiographical methods, it does not 
purport to be exhaustive. In particular, it does not aim to map all of the available methods 
of international law or the methods of legal history. Rather, it identifies a selected range of 
methods that can and have been used for writing the history of international law.144 While 
this section examines the defining characteristics of these methods, it acknowledges that 
“each is a living method, employed by a diverse community of scholars,” and that 
therefore, only a snapshot of them can be provided with perhaps some sense of their past 
and future trajectories.145  
This Article identifies seven major methods and/or approaches to international legal 
historiography: 1) Structuralism; 2) Post-structuralism; 3) Contextualism; 4) Textualism; 5) 
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Critical Legal Studies; 6) Third World Approaches to International Law; and 7) Law and 
Society approaches. The first four groups or schools of thought—Structuralism, Post-
structuralism, Contextualism, and Textualism—derive from intellectual history; the 
remaining three groups or schools of thought—Critical Legal Studies, Third World 
Approaches to International Law, and Law and Society approaches—derive from 
international and domestic law.  
Structuralism assumes that the historian’s job is to map “universally transcendent [legal] 
structures … without paying any attention at all to social context.”146 Focusing on doctrinal 
dogmas, it produces a type of history that is not really history at all.147 It investigates “the 
evolution of legal rules, paying attention to how those rules have changed over time.”148 
According to the structuralists, law can be understood as a ‘timeless and universal’ 149 
“language-system … governed by a deep grammar.”150  Accordingly, they focus on the 
‘deep grammar’ of international law.151 Whereas structuralism “had only a modest following 
among intellectual historians in general,” it “profoundly influenced the scholarship of a 
substantial group of legal historians.” 152 Nonetheless structuralist legal history has been 
increasingly criticized and “sidelined in the last decades of the 20th century,” for its  
ahistoricism and  rigidity.153 
Post-structuralism advocates critical ways of thinking. The contextualists, the 
Gramscians, the feminists, and the Frankfurt School could be included in this large group. 
Such movements share, for example, the perception that the historical and cultural context 
should be investigated, as well as a common approach of constant re-assessment of facts, 
events and theories. In other words, post-structuralism transforms historiography into a 
critical project.154 
Contextualism, the mainstream historiographical current, highlights the need to relate 
texts to their context and to constant re-assess facts, events and theories. It constitutes a 
reaction to structuralism. Contextualists highlights that the meaning of a text depends upon 
its historical context, and that, therefore, “the central job of the … historian is to 
reconstruct that context and then to interpret the text in light of it.” 155 According to 
Quentin Skinner, the founder of the Cambridge school of intellectual history,156 legal texts 
“should not be read as sources of timeless truths,” rather they should be seen as “political 
interventions in particular social contexts and political power struggles.” 157  Therefore, 
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international legal historians should approach past texts studying what their authors 
intended to do in their own historical context, rather than studying them anachronistically 
in light of current debates. For the contextualists, it is necessary to study both the text and 
its context to understand a given text.158 In fact, not only can the context —meant as the 
social, cultural and political background of a given text—“help in the understanding of a 
text”, but it also constitutes a sort of ‘shibboleth’, the master key to its proper 
meaning(s).159 In turn, “the understanding of texts … presupposes the grasp both of what 
they were intended to mean, and how this meaning was intended to be taken.” 160 Several 
international law scholars have expressed some sympathy for this approach,161 but also 
cautioned that the choice of the relevant contexts is a subjective endeavour which is 
unavoidably influenced by the (current) concerns of the researcher.162 
Textualism suggests that “each document produces … a multiplicity of meanings.”163 
Textualists argue that “it is futile to try to give meaning to an ambiguous text by looking to 
its context since the context is equally dependent on interpretation [of texts] for its 
meaning.”164 Moreover, treating a text as a mere “respons[e] to the ideas of [its] author[’s] 
contemporaries” seems rather determinist and neglects the “transcendent potential” of a 
given text.165 Rather, textualists suggest the existence of a continuous dialogue between a 
text and its readers and favor anachronism.166 For them there is a living bond between past 
and present. Textualist analyses “oscillat[e] between explications of texts themselves and 
reflections upon how those texts illuminate and are illuminated by . . . present-day legal 
thought and practice.”167 Some international lawyers have adopted some of the textualist 
methodological tenets, albeit implicitly.168 Legal historians, such as Quentin Skinner, have 
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criticized the textualist method in the history of ideas, for its contemporary outlook, and 
what he perceived as debilitating anachronism and presentism..169 
Since the 1970s, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) have contributed to the history of 
international law. 170  CLS have “no definitive methodological approach”; rather, their 
proponents uses a variety of methods “to address separate, but interrelated, failings 
perceived in the international legal project” including but not limited to poverty, cultural 
imperialisms and violence.171 They seem committed to “reappraising basic approaches to 
legal scholarship” 172  and stimulating disciplinary controversies with a deconstructionist 
approach. In post-structuralist way, they transform historiography into a critical project, 
criticizing the perceived failings of international law. They call for “any approach to the 
past that produces disturbances in the field-that inverts or scrambles familiar narratives . . . 
; anything that advances rival perspectives (such as those of the losers rather than the 
winners) for surveying developments, or that posits alternative trajectories that might have 
produced a very different present—in short any approach that unsettles the familiar 
strategies that we use to tame the past in order to normalize the present.”173 In sum, critical 
legal scholars “have sought to move beyond what constitutes law . . . to focus on the 
contradictions, hypocrisies and failings of international legal discourse”174 and “to create a 
more humane, egalitarian, and democratic society.”175 Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia 
is often considered a “manifestation of ‘postmodernism’ or ‘critical legal studies’ in 
international legal thinking.”176  
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL),177 the academic movement that 
aims at putting the colonial encounter at the center of (the history of) international law,178 is 
not a ‘method’ in a classical sense, but it constitutes a distinctive approach that questions 
the foundations, operations and methodological premises of international law. 179  While 
                                               
169 Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, HISTORY AND THEORY 8 (1969), 3, 48  
(arguing that “The understanding of texts … presupposes the grasp both of what they were intended to 
mean, and how this meaning was intended to be taken” and, at 49, that “[t]he ‘context’ … needs … to be 
treated as an ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable meanings, in a 
society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone to have intended to communicate.”) 
170 Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, STANFORD L. REV. 36 (1984) 57, 59; Jason Beckett, Critical 
International Legal Theory, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (2012) (noting that “Although most writings on public 
international law (PIL) possess an esprit critique, what distinguishes critical international legal theory (CILT) is a 
sense that the failings in the project are not marginal or exceptional, but endemic, consistent, and structural.”) 
*** this entry is available online *** 
171 See generally Beckett, Critical International Legal Theory. 
172 David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship, NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 21 
(1985–1986) 209. 
173 Robert W. Gordon, The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STANFORD L. REV. (1997) 1023, 1024. 
174 Ratner and Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law, 291. 
175 Duncan Kennedy and Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, YALE L. J. 94 (1984) 461, 461. 
176 Jean D’Aspremont, Martti Koskenniemi, the Mainstream, and Self-Reﬂectivity, LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 29 (2016) 625, 
629 (noting that Koskenniemi’s FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA “reject[s] reasoned narrative, [acknowledges] 
the instability of knowledge, [and] move[s] away from universal grand theories” but adding that such book 
has also been associated with structuralism).  
177 See generally James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative 
Bibliography, 3 TRADE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (2011) 26, 26 (“trac[ing] the contemporary origins of Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) in the late 1990’s” and “argu[ing] that since then, TWAIL-
ers … have generated … debate around questions of colonial history, power, identity and difference, and 
what these mean for international law”); Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 ASIL PROCEEDINGS (2000) 31, 
32 (“identify[ing] the historical bases for the TWAIL movement and discussing the basic philosophical and 
political interests of the movement.”) 
178 Michael Fakhri, Introduction - Questioning TWAIL’s Agenda, 4 OREGON REV. INT’L L. (2012), 1, 6 (noting 
that “TWAIL literature has focused on how international law is driven and shaped by the encounter between 
colonizer and colonized.”) 
179 Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in 
Internal Conflict, 2 CHINESE J INT’L L (2003) 77, 77 (highlighting that TWAIL constitutes “a distinctive wa[y] 




TWAIL does not merely focus on the history of international law, it appears that its 
historical reading of the colonial encounter influences its approaches to a range of 
international law issues.180 TWAIL scholars focus on the “history of the peoples of the 
Third World,” 181  suggesting “continuous complicities between international law and 
violence” 182  and “seek[ing] to transform international law from being a language of 
oppression to a language of emancipation.”183 In other words, they explore the colonial 
legacies of international law and engage in decolonizing efforts. TWAIL scholars have 
contributed several works to international legal history.184 
Law and Society (L&S) approaches set the history of international law “in its proper 
social context,”185 considering law as a social product186 and society as a product of law.187 
Law is “so tightly woven into the texture of social life, that it is hard to draw sharp lines 
between legal and extra-legal or ‘social reality’.”188 L&S scholars consider “law, society, 
culture and economy” to be “part of a larger common complex.”189 However, ‘a turn to 
social history’ which “has sometimes been advocated for international relations” has yet to 
enter into international law.190 In fact, international legal history has traditionally adopted 
state-centric lenses, 191  focusing on diplomatic or doctrinal histories rather than micro-
histories of individuals, societies, or sectors of the same. In other words, “international 
lawyers have been interested in the vicissitudes of sovereignty” rather than that of 
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societies.192 Few legal histories of international law have a wider focus and L&S approaches 
remain underused.193 
What are these methods’ contributions to the lawyers’ and historians’ histories of 
international law? Structuralism and textualism contribute to the lawyers’ histories. 
Structuralism looks for historical transcendence and hypothesizes that legal concepts have 
metaphysical, transcendent and eternal qualities. Analogously, textualism emphasizes the 
transcendence of a given text. By focusing on concepts and texts, structuralism and 
textualism have contributed to lawyers’ histories.  Contextualism and L&S approaches 
mainly contribute to historians’ histories. CLS can contribute to bridging the gap between 
historians’ histories and lawyers’ histories. By advocating critical ways of thinking, CLS can 
dispel some of the myths surrounding international legal history, such as the narrative of 
progress, and the alleged historical neutrality of the field.TWAIL scholars have contributed 
both to lawyers’ histories and historians’ histories of international law. While some have 
privileged an intra-disciplinary approach to the history of international law (mainly relying 
on legal sources rather than historical sources), others have conducted thorough historical 
investigations.   
From this survey, a number of questions arise. First, which, if any, of the methods 
reviewed above is most promising? As mentioned earlier, there is no perfect method or 
one-size-fits-all methodology to write the history of international law. Rather, the 
international legal historian is free to choose the suitable method to address given research 
questions. The plurality and rigour of the available methods diversify research types, styles, 
and outcomes, making international legal history an interesting and fruitful field of study.  
Second, is there any method by which the international legal historian can decide which 
of the seven (or more) methods to use? Can the international legal historian select from 
each method those elements that sound most appealing? None of the methods seems to 
predominate in the history of international law, nor is there an easy method for selecting an 
appropriate method for such investigation. Rather, methods need to be carefully selected 
on a case-by-case basis, namely on the basis of the given research questions, aims, and 
objectives. Rational choices among the methods are possible. Combining different 
methodological approaches is feasible too—for instance combining CLS with TWAIL or 
contextualism with L&S—as long as the selected approaches are closely related and/or 
compatible and ‘intellectual eclecticism’ does not “ea[t] away at the core premises of each 
method.” 194 In other words, the choice of given method(s) requires some commitment to 
the chosen method(s). Examples of successful eclecticism are not uncommon.195 
Third, how do the examined methods relate to each other? Are there convergences 
and/or divergences among them? Three sets of methods seem closely related: CLS, 
TWAIL, and L&S (with their emphasis on the need to adopt a critical stance to the 
evolution of international law, criticizing uneven distribution of power and injustice); 
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contextualism and L&S (with their emphasis on law in context); and textualism and 
structuralism (with their emphasis on the diachronic dimension of international law). But 
other linkages can be found. For example, structuralism and contextualism seem to be 
diametrically opposed methods with different aims and objectives, yet they offer 
complementary accounts of the history of international law. 
Fourth, are there any trends in the development of methods for writing the history of 
international law? The ongoing trend to move away from a mere structuralist approach to 
adopt contextualist methods reflects a growing interest for a historical approach to 
international law as opposed to a purely internal/legal one. The emergence of L&S and 
TWAIL approaches to the history of international law reflects the increasingly important 
role played by individuals and peoples in international law and legal history. While states 
remain the classical subjects of international law, individuals and peoples have started to 
play a significant role in the evolution of international law. In parallel, legal historians have 
increasingly focused on micro-histories. While this section has described some significant 
methods, others exist and may well produce significant scholarship in the future. New 
methods may emerge as well, in response to emerging research questions. As a matter of 
fact, the scrutiny of the promises and pitfalls of the principal methods currently employed 
“may plant the seeds for new methodological projects that can invigorate [the] field.”196 
Finally, what do the existing methods suggest about the future of the field? Each of these 
methods (with the exception of TWAIL) originated in an approach to national legal history 
and or national law. Their conceptual move from the national sphere to the international 
domain reflects the expansion and pervasiveness of international law in human affairs, and 
its emergence as a subject worthy of historical investigation.197New discussions of domestic 
historiography can benefit the history of international law. In turn, not only can 
international legal history contribute to the evolution of international law, but also to the 
development of legal history providing it new perspectives, new topoi and fields for study.  
While almost a century ago, Momigliano boldly announced the end of legal history as a 
discipline,198 considering it as a mere part of history, the history of international law is alive 
and kicking. Moreover, one may wonder whether it should be considered a mere 
appendage of international law or history respectively, or a hybrid mixture of the two, or an 
emerging field of study. 
 
5.    Legal Biographies: A Road Worth Taking? 
Stories are told and not lived; life is lived and not told.199 
Depending on the selected object of inquiry, three modes of writing history can be 
identified—the history of events, the history of concepts and the history of individual 
people.200 Diplomatic history has traditionally focused on events relevant to international 
law. The history of international law has traditionally focused on concepts. Legal biography 
narrates the history of the lives of persons relevant to international law. Biographies do not 
constitute a special method of investigation; rather they constitute a literary genre, a way of 
approaching international legal history and a type of micro-history.  
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Legal biography has not been a very popular literary genre in international law. The 
history of international law has often obscured the richness of individual stories in favor of 
an examination of trends, events, or concepts. Not only were international law scholars 
uninterested in the life of its makers,201 but there was an anti-biographical tradition in 
international law. In turn, historians consider biographies as a ‘borderline genre’, “a 
peripheral, blurry area” between history and literature.202 This neglect reflected a broader 
trend in historiography which rarely focused on the individual contribution to the making 
of history.203 Legal biographies are a risky business for “a triple obstacle: the irrelevance of 
the topic … according to the traditional criteria; the scarcity of evidence; and the absence 
of stylistic models”.204  
Let’s examine these three obstacles. First, the life of international lawyers has been 
perceived to be historically irrelevant. There is a general perception that lawyers are not 
necessarily interesting and/or historically relevant individuals, and that few international 
law scholars and practitioners are worthy of a biography. In general terms, lawyers are 
perceived as “agents, rather than principals,” “engag[ing] in specialized and highly repetitive 
work that is typically dull in its quotidian routines and difficult to represent in an engaging 
manner.” 205 Moreover, as a literary category, legal biographies can dissatisfy international 
law scholars, legal historians, and general readers. International law scholars may want a 
more in-depth treatment of the work of a given scholar, legal historians may expect the use 
of appropriate historical methods, and the general public may want a more in-depth 
treatment of the person behind the work. It may be difficult to satisfy different audiences.  
Second, the scarcity of evidence can make the collection of raw materials of a lawyer’s life 
and their elaboration into a significant whole challenging. This criticism is often overrated; 
as a matter of fact, international lawyers’ correspondence, personal papers and network can 
help the researcher to delineate the person in addition to her work. The study of both 
written and visual evidence can generate significant data.206  
Third, the absence of stylistic models is due to scarcity of legal biographies in the first 
place. Legal biographies are perceived to be an ‘epistemological minefield’ and a 
‘problematic form’ of both legal and historiographic scholarship.207 While legal scholars 
question whether legal biography is really legal scholarship, 208  contending that legal 
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biographies suffer from ‘methodological individualism,’ 209  historians question whether 
biographies belong to historiography or rather constitute a literary genre (Bildungsroman),210 
or a type of ‘hagiography.’211  
What can legal biographies offer to the study of international legal history? If 
international law is understood as a pure technical subject, then its operators are of little 
interest. However, if international law is conceived as an art and a science, then 
investigating the role its artists and scientists played in its making acquires great relevance. 
Not only can the biographies of international law scholars constitute a rich and important 
source of information about the international legal system,212  but they also contribute to 
the knowledge of history and constitute a legacy for future generations. They can inspire 
and teach.213  Studying the life of predecessors can be empowering, “providing inspiration 
and encouragement” especially in times of adversity.214 . 
As a matter of fact, some international law scholars and practitioners make great 
biographical subjects, offering appealing narrative arcs, “compelling passages[,] and 
dramatic moments.”215 Alberico Gentili (1552–1608), one of the founders of the discipline, 
became a Professor of law at the University of Oxford after narrowly escaping the 
Inquisition and becoming a religious refugee. 216  Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), another 
founder of the discipline, was imprisoned for his involvement in religious disputes of the 
Dutch Republic, but escaped hidden in a chest of books.217 But international lawyers have 
not faced extraordinary challenges only in early modern history. Rather, even more 
recentlythey have overcome wars and exiles, persecution and loss.218 These histories show 
international lawyers’ resilience in the face of adversity, how they became masters of their 
own destiny, and contributed to the making of the field.   
International lawyers are gradually becoming interested in their predecessors, and a new 
biographical direction for the field has emerged. The publication of THE GENTLE 
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS by Martti Koskenniemi has been a watershed in the writing of 
international legal history. The book adopts the biographical method for studying key 
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figures including Hans Kelsen, Hersch Lauterpacht, Carl Schmitt, and Hans Morgenthau. 
By turning international lawyers into main protagonists, Koskenniemi’s history of 
international law overcomes the “constraints of the structural method” and “infuses the 
study of international law with a sense of historical motion and political, even personal, 
struggle. . . .”219 Other monographs and edited collections have focused on international 
law scholars and practitioners.220 International law journals have launched a series of legal 
biographies.221 Other articles have appeared in journals of legal history or international 
law.222 
While writing legal biographies of international law scholars seems a road worth taking, 
are there methodological issues characterizing this specific genre? Some guidelines can help 
biographers to find their voice in narrating the life of others. First, legal biographers should 
explain why a legal scholar—unlike the vast majority of scholars—deserves biographical 
treatment. This is not to say that only the great masters should be studied.223 On the one 
hand, ‘supposedly lesser international lawyers’ can be even more interesting precisely 
because they are not well-known.224 On the other hand, focusing only on the great masters 
risks transforming legal biographies into hagiographies, as if international law was made 
only by a handful of individuals, rather than being a truly cosmopolitan and collective 
endeavor. Rather, explaining why one scholar deserves a biography helps the reader to 
decide whether the study can be useful and/or interesting.   
Second, it is not sufficient to highlight the public achievements of a brilliant career, “as 
this will miss significant aspects of [an individual’s] life.” 225  A legal biographer should 
provide a sense of the subject as a person and of her place within the broader historical 
context in which she lived.226 A biographer has to “shape and unify . . . materials within a 
coherent narrative, and to craft an argument that persuades us as to the . . . meaning of the 
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subject’s life” within a given historical context.227 A mere description of the principal events 
of public and private lives without an analysis of their historical context would not 
contribute to the history of international law. 
Third, all biographies are ‘intersubjective’ as “one person’s story is always the story of 
others.”228 Personal relationships with colleagues, mentors and family members can provide 
a fuller picture of the subject. Not only can network analysis provide additional insights as 
to the cultural, political and social context in which the author lived and work, but it can 
also provide additional insights into his or her personality and his or her contribution to 
the field.229 
Fourth, in writing legal biographies, international legal historians should not glorify the 
past; rather, they should conduct rigorous historical legal research. Ideally, legal biographies 
should be relevant to lawyers and historians as well as a broader audience.  
Fifth—the objectivity question—can the international legal historian remain external to 
the world she aims to know? Are there objective narratives? While international legal 
historians aim to be objective,230 “every author writes from an individual perspective.”231 
Unavoidably, “the questions that we raise about the past are informed, explicitly or 
implicitly, by our own personal experiences or the questions raised by our current historical 
moment.”232 In particular, biographies are often “the product of the biographies of the 
subject and the biographer.”233 If a subjective perspective is inevitable,234 greater awareness 
of the authorial role in all narratives, enhanced reflexivity in research and definition of the 
relationship between the author and the subject of inquiry become crucial. Some 
transparency is needed upfront about the expertise of the author, the selected perspective 
and approach, and the type of sources utilized. Authors should “consciously reflect about 
the choices they make,” and be “explicit and transparent about them.”235 In this manner, 
the “inevitable distortions are themselves a source of richness for . . . argumentation and 
thinking rather than an invalidating flaw.”236 
Sixth, to whom should legal historians and international lawyers address their work? 
There is a fine line between academic and popular literature. So far, international legal 
historians have maintained an essentially academic approach, avoiding too much narrative, 
and prioritizing evaluation and historical insight. Their writings are hardly aimed towards 
the general public. Yet, one may wonder whether international legal scholars “should 
consider how best to persuade [a] wider audience of the value of [international] legal 
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history”237 and whether international historical research should be both understandable and 
interesting for ‘outsiders.’ Directing academic work towards a large audience would make it 
impactful beyond the four corners of academia.  
Finally, should textual research be coupled with visual and ethnographical research? 
Should international legal historians visit the places where historical events occurred to 
connect themselves with characters from the past? The question as to whether 
international legal history should be ethnographically informed remains open. 238 
International legal ethnography is an almost unmapped terrain, despite some recent efforts 
to fill this gap.239 Ethnography is a type of research relying on data acquired via slow-paced 
participant observation. Fieldwork for international legal historians can include: talking 
with colleagues off the records; watching films or listening to recordings; walking through 
relevant city streets or visiting other relevant places; conducting interviews with relevant 
stakeholders. 240  Certainly, there is a new interest in the material and visual culture of 
international law.241  
However, while recent international law can be studied through oral exchange, and 
certain aspects of international law, such as boundary delimitation, can require the study of 
objects and sites, the classic method of researching international law history is to read 
texts. 242  In most cases, it is no longer possible to interview the lawyers, judges and 
academics who contributed to the making of international law. In certain cases, it is no 
longer possible to see the places where these people lived due to the redevelopment of 
given zones. These difficulties however, do not affect the potential added value of 
ethnographical research to the history of international law.  
 
6.    What are the Promises and Perils of this Turn to History? 
 
There is no single legal method in the historiography of international law. International 
lawyers and legal historians have approached the history of international law from different 
perspectives, adopting different historiographical methods. International lawyers are not 
writing like historians and legal historians are not writing like international lawyers, nor 
should we expect otherwise.  
On the one hand, international law scholars have defended a dogmatic way of doing 
international law history based on the genealogy of ideas and an alleged “continuity 
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between past and present.”243 They claim that the history of international law “is inherently 
genealogical, depending as it does upon the transmission of concepts, languages and norms 
across time and space.” 244  While offering rich conceptual motives, their narrative risks 
perpetuating myths detached from the historical truth.245 
Historians, on the other hand, contextualize law “specifying its temporal, spatial, and 
social context” and challenging its pretended eternity, autonomy, and separateness. 246 
According to the historiographical tradition, every historical account is provisional.247 In 
fact, “[h]istory is always being rewritten, not only because what interests one age does not 
necessarily appeal to its successor, but also because a wealth of new material is continually 
coming to light, or being made much more accessible.” 248  Legal historians look for 
historical truth, relying on empirical methods and gathering information from the 
archives.249 The search for historical truth can be somehow idealistic—it is impossible to 
reconstruct, for even if we had all the historical sources in the world, we still would not 
know entirely what happened and how people understood what happened. Yet, today no 
authoritative historical work can be published without reference to verifiable historical 
sources.250 Engagement with primary sources and archives has become de rigueur. As the 
historian Carlo Ginzburg points out, “the greater our distance from the primary evidence 
is, the greater the risk of being caught out by hypothesis put forward either by 
intermediaries or by ourselves actually becomes. In other words, we risk finding what we 
are looking for—and nothing else”.251 The ‘archive fever,’ 252 or ‘mal de texte’ 253 can greatly 
contribute to unveiling new facts and data and promoting new interpretations of the 
past.254 Archival research can provide a real feel for the ways in which given institutions 
functioned and individual people lived.255  Investigating “the available sources first and 
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see[ing] what kind of questions they raise or might answer” can be a fruitful approach.256 
While full access often was impaired by inadequate cataloging, today the indexing and 
cataloging of archives, as well as the ongoing digitization of data sources, has opened up 
archives previously thought inaccessible on account of poor cataloging. The cross-
fertilization of archival data with that from other sources—including law, literature, and the 
fine arts—has re-positioned archives as just one among many tools of the scholar’s trade. 
Each of the available methods has pros and cons. Both international lawyers’ legal history 
and historians’ legal history are valuable. 257  The disciplinary background of scientists 
influences how they perceive the objects of their investigation. However, while an 
excessive emphasis on the international law component risks obscuring the historical 
component of international legal history, at the same time, an excessive emphasis on the 
historical component risks obscuring the international law component of the same. Should 
international lawyers and legal historians overcome disciplinary parochialism, cross-
disciplinary boundaries, and adopt an interdisciplinary approach? Some scholars contend 
that international law scholars and legal historians should not become ‘too 
interdisciplinary,’ as “they risk becoming the captive of another discipline.”258 However, as 
Lauterpacht put it, once a lawyer, always a lawyer.259 Arguably the same is valid for legal 
historians. Therefore, “there is room for association with other disciplines.”260 
In conclusion, in the words of an early international legal historian, “history may be 
compared to a vast and diversified country, which gives very different sort of pleasures 
[and difficulties] to different travellers, or to the same traveller if [she] visits it at different 
times”.261 There is no single history, but “many histories of international law.”262 There is 
no single way to address the law/history divide. Rather, multiple approaches and methods 
have been devised to write international legal histories. The origins of international law “are 
to be found in different and multiple sites, and they cannot usefully be traced back to any 
single source, or through examining the evolution of a single theme, process, or 
institution.” 263 While international legal histories differ; the various types of international 
legal history are equally valid,264 and “each of the different historiographical approaches has 
something important to offer.” 265 
At the same time, “we should be more self-conscious about methodology”: “we must be 
careful with sources, pursue facts diligently, recognize the contributions of others, … [and 
make] sense of the political and social culture of a period.” 266 Awareness of the various 
legal historical approaches can enrich the texture of international legal history. International 
legal historians can rely on decades of meaningful methodological reflection and bridge the 
gap between history and law. 
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International legal history as a field of study and international legal histories as its outputs 
have come of age. International legal history does not seem to constitute an autonomous 
discipline yet; rather, it remains a hybrid field of study at the crossroad between legal 
history and international law. The history of international law has become a ‘source of 
tension’ between legal historians and international lawyers.267 These epistemic communities 
have different aims, objectives, and approaches. While legal historians aim to discover 
‘historical truth,’ 268 international lawyers aim to investigate the genealogy of given legal 
concepts. While legal historians consider law as a historical product and examine its 
historical context, international lawyers consider law as a timeless, ahistorical, and 
autonomous object. 
There is no single ‘one-size-fits-all methodology’;269 rather, methods abound, involving 
multiple aims, objectives and approaches. No particular technique is better than another.270 
Instead, different methods and approaches can co-exist; it is up to the researcher to 
identify a suitable method for reaching his or her research objectives. The identification 
and calibration of the research method on the basis of research needs is not a completely 
subjective endeavor; rather, there is a rich panoply of methods which researchers can use. 
Analogously, there is no ideal form of research, as histories of concepts, legal biographies 
and institutional histories all contribute to the complex kaleidoscope composed by the 
histories of international law.  
This Article contends that the battle of ideas about the proper methodology of the 
history of international law can and has been gradually overcome by a growing awareness 
of the complementarity of expertise and know-how of the two groups of scholars. Rather 
than suggesting a consolidated, but passé, intra-disciplinary approach to the history of 
international law (that is, approaching the history of international law from a purely internal 
perspective), interdisciplinary, cross-disciplinary, and multidisciplinary approaches should 
be preferred, given that both legal history and international law are necessary components 
of the emerging field of the history of international law. The Article suggests that the 
acknowledgment of a given cultural background and methodological awareness can 
promote better narrations of the history of international law. International lawyers and 
legal historians can overcome each other’s weaknesses, reinforce each other’s strengths, 
and engage in fruitful dialogue. Such engagement can encourage new ways to think about 
the history of international law. Only through methodological awareness can the history of 
international law evolve from its status as a ‘subdiscipline’ of both international law and 
history to an independent mode of analysis. In this manner, “law becomes history, [and] 
history becomes law.”271 International legal history has the potential to break down the 
boundaries between international law and history, as well as those between past and 
present. It does not aim to explain ‘history for the sake of history’; rather, it aims at 
“understand[ing] law as history/history as law.” 272 
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